Diversified General Corporation, A Utah Corporation v. White Barn Golf Course, Inc., A Utah Corporation, Keith B. Downs, Albert Sanone, Aok Lands, Inc., A Utah Corporation, And John Does, 1 Through 8 Inclusive : Appellant\u27s Brief by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)
1977
Diversified General Corporation, A Utah
Corporation v. White Barn Golf Course, Inc., A
Utah Corporation, Keith B. Downs, Albert Sanone,
Aok Lands, Inc., A Utah Corporation, And John
Does, 1 Through 8 Inclusive : Appellant's Brief
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors. Patterson, Phillips, Gridley & Echard; Attorney for Defendants-
RespondentsParsons & Crowther; Plaintiff-Appellant
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Diversified General Corp. v. White Barn Golf Course, No. 15462 (Utah Supreme Court, 1977).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/877
., ~ 
f ,.. 
·' '( 
.. ~r 
~ ~j5'j_; 
RSIFIED GENEM.L. 
'lftah corporatjp)t; 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
----0000000----
DIVERSIFIED GENERAL CORPORATION, ) 
a Utah Corporation, ) 
) 
Plaintiff and Appellant, ) 
) 
vs. ) 
) 
WHITE BARN GOLF COURSE, INC. , a ) 
Utah Corporation, KEITH B. DOWNS,) 
ALBERT SANONE, A OK LANDS INCOR- ) 
PORATED, a Utah Corporation, and ) 
JOHN DOES 1 Through 8 inclusive, ) 
) 
Defendants and Respondents.) 
District Court No. 67122 
Supreme Court No. 15462 
Appeal from Summary Judgment of the Second District Court for 
Weber County, State of Utah 
THE HONORABLE RONALD O. HYDE, 
Presiding 
For the Plaintiff-Appellant 
PARSONS & CROWTHER 
Attorneys at Law 
310 South Main Street, Suite 310 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
For the Defendants-Respondents 
PATTERSON, PHILLIPS, GRIDLEY & ECHARD 
Attorneys at Law 
427 - 27th Street 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
NI1TUHE OF CASE 
DISPOSD'ION IN LOWER COURT 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
FACTS 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: 
UTAH CASE LAW DISTINGUISHES BETWEEN A 
REAL ESTATE BROKER OR SALESMAN AND A 
FINDER AND ESTABLISHES THAT THE MERE 
INTRODUCTION OF A POTENTIAL BUYER TO 
A SELLER OF REAL PROPERTY DOES NOT OF-
FEND THE PUBLIC POLICY BEHIND NOR VIO-
LATE THE REAL ESTATE BROKER'S STATUTES 
A. ANDERSEN v. JOHNSON 
B. CHASE v. MORGAN 
POINT II: 
UTAH LAW AS HERETOFORE DISCUSSED IS CON-
SISTENT WITH THAT OF CALIFORNIA WHICH HAS 
LONG DISTINGUISHED BETIVEEN REAL ESTATE 
PAGE 
1 
2 
2 
2 
3 
4 
5 
9 
BROKERS OR SALESMEN AND FINDERS. 11 
CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 
CASES CITED 
Andersen v. Johnson, 108 Utah 417, 160 P. 2d 725 (1945) 5 
Chase v. Morgan, 9 Utah 2d 125, 339 P.2d 1019 (1959) 9 
Tyrone v. Kelley, 106 Cal.Rptr. 761, 507 P.2d 65, at 
70 n. 5 (1973) 11 
i Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
PAGE 
STJ\TUTES CITED 
7A UTAH CODE ANN. §61-2-1 ( 1953) 2, 4 
7A UTAH CODE ANN. §61-2-2 (1953) 5 
7A UTAH CODE ANN. §61-2-18 (1953) 5 
UTAH CODE ANN. §82-2-2 (1943) 6 
ii Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
---0000000---
DIVERSIFIED GENERAL CORPORATION, ) 
a Utah Corporation, ) 
) 
Plaintiff and Appellant, ) 
) 
vs. ) 
) 
WHITE BAR.N GOLF COURSE, INC. , a ) 
Utah Corporation, KEITH B. DOWNS,) 
ALBERT SANONE, A OK LANDS INCOR- ) 
PORATED, a Utah Corporation, and ) 
JOHN DOES, 1 Through 8 inclusive.) 
) 
Defendants and Respondents.) 
CASE No. 15462 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
NATURE OF CASE 
Plaintiff, Diversified General Corporation ("DGC"), brought 
this action to recover the balance of a "finder's" fee to which 
it deems itself entitled by the terms and provisions of a 
written and subsequent oral agreement with Defendant White Barn 
Golf Course, Inc. ("White Barn"), for having found a purchaser 
for certain real property owned and offered for sale by White 
Barn. 
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DISPOSITION IN LO\\TER COURT 
Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment which 
was subsequently argued to and heard by the court. Summary 
judgment was awarded in favor of Defendants on the grounds 
that one who undertakes for a fee to secure a purchaser for 
property belonging to another comes within the purview of 
the Real Estate Broker's Statute, 7A UTAH CODE ANN. §61-2-1 
et seq. (1953), which precludes an action for recovery of 
compensation by one not licensed as a real estate broker or 
salesman. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
DGC seeks an order reversing the decision of the lower 
court and setting aside summary judgment. 
FACTS 
On January 6, 1976, a "Finder's Agreement" ("Agreement") 
was executed between DGC and White Barn, whereby DGC was 
given the right to find a buyer for White Barn's golf course 
and condominium development. In the event that DGC were 
able to find a buyer and the sale were consumm~ted, White 
Barn agreed to pay to DGC 13-1/3% of the sales price and 
convey a condominium to DGC. The Agreement specifically 
stated that no services other than those of a finder were ~ 
be rendered by DGC (Record at 7-8). Subsequent to the Agree-
ment, DGC found a potential Buyer and introduced him to a 
White Barn representative. DGC did not participate in the 
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ensuing sales negotiations, nor in the preparation of sales 
documents and was not present at the closing (Record at 32) . 
Prior to the closing, however, DGC and White Barn orally 
agreed that DGC would not receive the condominium unit and 
would receive as its fee the amount of $150,000.00, only. 
After the closing DGC agreed to the payment of its fee 
in installments, with a down payment of $35,000.00, which 
dmvn payment was paid and received by DGC (Record at 3). 
However, White Barn failed to pay the balance of the fee, 
and on March 28, 1977, DGC filed a complaint to recover the 
balance of $115,000.00. On June 9, 1977, the Defendants moved 
the lower court for summary judgment on the grounds that DGC's 
activities in finding a buyer were those of a real estate 
broker or salesman, that DGC was not a licensed broker or sales-
man, and therefore, could not lawfully recover a finder's fee 
(Record at 28-30). The motion was argued before the lower court 
on June 21, 1977. On August 30, 1977, the court, by memorandum 
decision (Record at 39-41) granted the motion for summary judg-
ment, and summary judgment was entered in favor of Defendants 
on September 26, 1977 (Record at 48). Plaintiff thereafter 
filed this appeal on October 6, 1977. 
ARGUMENT 
The issue raised by this appeal, and narrowly drawn by 
the lower court's memorandum decision is simply whether the 
-3-
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real estate broker's statutes should apply to one who merely 
introduces a potential buyer to an owner and seller of real 
property. 
POINT I 
UTAH CASE LAW DISTINGUISHES BETWEEN A 
REAL ESTATE BROKER OR SALESMAN AND A 
FINDER AND ESTABLISHES THAT THE MERE 
INTRODUCTION OF A POTENTIAL BUYER TO 
A SELLER OF REAL PROPERTY DOES NOT OF-
FEND THE PUBLIC POLICY BEHIND NOR VIO-
LATE THE REAL ESTATE BROKER'S STATUTES. 
The pertinent parts of the applicable s ta +-ntes which 
Defendant claim require a finder to be licensed and wlLLch 
prohibit an action to recover compensation by one not so 
licensed are as follows: 
It shall be unlawful for any person, copartr,.er-
ship or corporation to engage in the businc~s, 
act in the capacity of, advertise or assume to 
act as a real estate broker or a real estate 
salesman within this state without first obtain-
ing a license under the provisions of this chap-
ter. 
7A UTAH CODE ANN. §61-2-1 (1953). 
The term "real estate broker" within the meaning 
of this chapter shall include all persons, part-
nerships, associations and corporations, foreign 
and domestic, who for another and for a fee, com-
mission or other valuable consideration, or who 
in the expectation or upon the promise of receiv-
ing or collecting a fee, commission or other 
-4-
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valuable consideration, assists or directs 
in the procuring of prospects or the negotiations 
or closing of any transaction which does or is 
calculated to result in the sale, exchange, leas-
ing or renting of any real estate. 
7A UTAH CODE ANN. §61-2-2 (1953). 
(a) No person, partnership, association or cor-
poration shall bring or maintain an action in any 
court of this state for the recovery of commission, 
a fee, or compensation for any act done or service 
rendered the doing or rendering of which is pro-
hibited under the provisions of this act to other 
than licensed real estate brokers, unless such per-
son was duly licensed hereunder as a real estate 
broker at the time of the doing of such act or the 
rendering of such service. 
7A UTAH CODE ANN. §61-2-18 (1953). 
A. Andersen v. Johnson. 
There are principally two Utah cases dealing with 
and resolving the issue raised by this appeal. The first 
chronologically is Andersen v. Johnson, 108 Utah 417, 160 
P.2d 725 (1945), in which the plaintiff entered into an 
oral agreement with defendant by which plaintiff obligated 
himself to assist defendant, who was a licensed real 
estate broker, in securing listings of real estate for sale 
by defendant. In consideration of plaintiff's services, 
defendant promised to give to plaintiff a full. one-third 
portion of the commission earned by defendant as a result of 
any such listing and sale. Plaintiff was himself not licensed 
as a real estate broker or salesman. Plaintiff subsequently 
-5-
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introduced defendant to the owner of certain real pro~~ 
and defendant was thereby enabled to list and sell said 
property, earning a conunission which, however, he refused 
to share with plaintiff as required by their agreement. 
Plaintiff brought an action to recover his portion of 
the commission and defendant responded with a demurrer. 
The substance of the demurrer was that plaintiff, by 
assisting defendant to procure listings, had acted and 
should be classified as a real estate broker in accor-
dance with the then statutory definition of the same, 
set forth in UTAH CODE ANN. §82-2-2 (1943) [now UTAH CODE 
ANN. §61-2-2 (1953)], which reads in pertinent part as 
follows: 
The term "real estate broker" within the mean-
ing of this chapter shall include all persons . . 
who with the intention or in the expectation or 
upon the promise of receiving or collecting a fee, 
commission, or other valuable consideration ... 
assists or directs in the procuring of prospects 
. calculated to result in the sale ... of 
any real estate. (emphasis added) 
The district court agreed with defendant's proposi-
tion that plaintiff's assistance in securing listings 
made plaintiff a real estate broker, and since plaintiff 
was not licensed as such, he could not recover any portion 
of defendant's commission. 
The supreme court, obviously uneasy about nullifying 
-6-
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an otherwise valid and bona fide agreement, reversed and 
remanded on the grounds that the term "prospects" as used 
in UTAH CODE ANN. §82-2-2 (1943), supra, referred only to 
those interested in purchasing realty and not to those 
wishing to sell: 
While it is necessary to secure listings, the 
term "real estate prospect" refers to one interested 
in the purchase of realty ... and does not refer 
to one from whom you might secure a listing. 
Andersen v. Johnson, supra, at 729. 
Justice Wade, in recognition of the awkwardness of 
the majority's dictum definition of "prospects" as poten-
tial purchasers but not sellers of realty, concurred in 
the result but offered more tenable and non-discriminatory 
reasoning for it: 
I cannot agree that the phrase 'assists or directs 
in the procuring of prospects' in Sec. 82-2-2, U.C.A. 
1943, defining 'Real Estate Broker' is limited to 
'one interested in the purchase of realty or in ob-
taining a lease of its use and does not refer to 
one from whom you might secure a listing' as stated 
in the prevailing opinion. I think the word 'pros-
pect' includes the prospective seller of property 
as well as the prospective buyer. 
Andersen v. Johnson, supra, at 729 (Wade, J. concurring) 
Justice Wade then furnished a public policy basis for 
excluding appellant from the coverage of UTAH CODE ANN. 
§82-2-2 (1943), supra: 
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Whereas a literal reading of Sec. 82-2-2 would 
include anyone not specifically exempted therein 
who, for compensation, was in any manner connect~d 
with a transaction involving real estate, as for 
instance a stenographer in a real estate broker's 
office who contacted people desiring a listing, 
I am of the opinion that such is not the intent or 
meaning of this section. A reading of the statutes 
regulating real estate brokers makes it apparent 
they were enacted for the benefit of the public to 
protect them from dishonest and unscrupulous real 
estate agents. Such protection of the public is 
not needed from the casual or remote influence of 
a stenographer or of a person who may wish to deal 
with him. Neither the stenographer nor the man who 
introduces the broker in the examples I have men-
tioned are active participants in any contract af-
fecting real estate or any liability of the persons 
entering into such contracts or listings. The 
dealings which the statutes aim to protect tFie pub-
lic in are those which result in legal liabilities 
between the parties. Nothing the stenographer or 
the man who introduces the real estate broker does, 
has that effect. This is true even though the real 
estate broker contracts to pay the man who introduces 
him a part of his commission in the event he makes a 
sale. (emphasis added) 
Andersen v. Johnson, supra, at 729-30 (Wade, J. con-
curring). 
Justice Wade's resolution of the difficulty is superic 
to that of the majority in that it does away with the 
meaningless distinction between potential buyers and 
sellers, provides a more real is tic and rational public 
policy basis for sustaining an agreement like the one ~ 
Andersen and avoids the harsh results and strained reas~ 
ing which frequently follow the bad law of hard cases. 
-8-
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B. Chase v. Morgan. 
In Chase v. Morgan, 9 Utah 2d 125, 339 P.2d 1019 
(1959), the second of the two principal Utah cases, the 
supreme court again confronted the real estate broker's 
statutes and this time the issue was whether appellant, 
who had supplied respondent with prospective purchasers 
for its oil and gas leases, was precluded by the statutes 
from recovering his agreed-upon compensation. 
Justice Wade, this time writing the majority opinion, con-
eluded that the appellant had violated the statutes beca~se his 
agreement with respondent involved more than the mere 
introduction of a buyer; it authorized appellant to make 
the sales himself: 
It is clear from the above evidence that 
appellant and his associates were authorized 
to sell or negotiate the sale of the leases 
involved. Such an agreement contemplated more 
than the mere finding or introduction of a 
buyer and clearly was the sort of activity em-
braced within the definition of "Real estate 
broker" quoted above. (Emphasis added). 
Chase v. Morgan, supra, at 1021. 
Consistent with his concurring opinion in Andersen, 
Justice Wade implies clearly in Chase that the mere finding 
or introduction of a buyer or seller is not enough to make 
one a broker because public policy does not require it. 
-9-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
His reason for holding that appellant in Chase had viola: 
the statutes was that appellant had been more than 
a fin 
i.e., he was authorized to go beyond mere finding and i~ 
traducing and actually sell or negotiate the sale of 
respondent's leases. Clearly, such sales or negotiation', 
unlike a mere finding or introducing, would give rise~ 
legal liabilities, and public policy would therefore man-
date that appellant and other similarly situated be 
licensed and regula tecl for the protection of their pr in-
cipals, and those dealing with them. To again quote 
Justice Wade: 
The dealings which the statutes aim to 
protect the public in are those which re-
sult in legal liabilities between the 
parties. 
Andersen v. Johnson, supra, at 730. 
As found and stated by the lower court in its memorandM 
decision, the case at bar involves the mere contacting and 
introducing of a potential buyer and nothing more (Record at 
39) • Indeed, the written agreement executed by appellant a~ 
respondent in the case at bar specified that no other ser-
vices than those of a "finder" were to be rendered by appellac~ 
(Record at 8), which makes the case at bar quite distinguis~ 
able from Chase. 
-10-
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A consideration of its facts shows the case at bar to be 
very similar to Andersen, the only pertinent distinction being 
that in Andersen appellant introduced a prospective seller 
and in the case at bar appellant introduced a buyer. In neither 
case did appellant presume to sell or negotiate a sale without 
a broker's license, in neither case did appellant agree or 
receive authorization to sell or negotiate a sale, and it 
should follow that in neither case will appellant be denied 
recovery of compensation bargained for and earned. 
POINT II 
UTAH LAW AS HERETOFORE DISCUSSED IS CON-
SISTENT WITH THAT OF CALIFORNIA WHICH HAS 
LONG DISTINGUISHED BETWEEN REAL ESTATE 
BROKERS OR SALESMEN AND FINDERS. 
California courts have long recognized the important 
distinction between real estate brokers or salesmen and finders 
and have, accordingly, excluded finders from the coverage of 
the California statutes defining real estate brokers, even 
though such statutes define brokers to include those who 
solicit for prospective purchasers. Tyrone v. Kelley, 106 
Cal. Rptr. 761, 507 P.2d 65, at 70 n.5 (1973). 
The court in Tyrone speaks very cogently about the dis-
tinction between brokers and finders and the policy reasons 
-11-
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for recognizing it: 
Defendants urge that Tyrone is not entitled to 
a judgment against them on the agreement since he 
performed the services of a real estate broker in 
California, but was not licensed as a broker in 
California. They maintain that his recovery is 
barred under the provisions of section 10136 of 
the Business and Professions Code and related sec-
tions. 
Numerous cases have held that one who simply finds 
and introduces two parties to a real estate transac-
tion need not be licensed as a real estate broker. 
Such an intermediary or middleman is protected by 
the finder's exception to the real estate licensing 
laws, an exception first established in Shaffer v. 
Beinhorn (1923) 190 Cal. 569, 573-574, 213 P. 960. 
In that case, this court held that a person who 
contracted to introduce a seller to a prospective 
purchaser did not act as a broker but as a finder. 
Many subsequent cases have recognized the excepti~. 
(See, e.g., Batson v. Strehlow, 68 Cal.2d 662, 669 
68 Cal.Rptr. 589, 441 P.2d 101; Davis v. Chipman, 
210 Cal. 609 619-620, 293 P. 40; Zappas v. King Williams 
Press, Inc., 10 Cal.App.3d 768, 772-773, 89 Cal.Rptr, 
307; Hasckian v. Krotz, 268 Cal.App.2d 311, 319-
324, 74 Cal.Rptr. 410; Porter v. Cirod, Inc., 242 
Cal.App.2d 761, 762-763, 51 Cal.Rptr. 784; Evans v. 
Riverside Internat. Raceway, 237 Cal.App.2d 666, 
675-677, 47 Cal.Rptr. 187; Spielberg v. Granz, 185 
Cal.App.2d 283, 290-291, 8 Cal.Rptr. 190; Palmer v. 
Wahler, 133 Cal.App.2d 705, 708-711, 285 P.2d 8; 
Freeman v. Jergins, 125 Cal.App.2d 536, 546-551, 
271 P.2d 210; Crofoot v. Spivak, 113 Cal.App.2d 146, 
147-148, 248 P.2d 45; Rhode v. Bartholomew, 94 Cal.-
App.2d 272, 279-282, 210 P.2d 768.) 
The finder is a person whose employment is limited 
to bringing the parties together so that they may 
negotiate their own contract, and the distinction 
between the finder and the broker frequently turns 
upon whether the intermediary has been invested wiili 
authority to participate in negotiations. (See, e.g., 
Batson v. Strehlow, supra, 68 Cal.2d 662, 669, 68 Cal.· 
Rptr. 589, 441 P. 2d 1001; Davis v. Chipman, supra, 2H 
Cal.609, 619-620, 293 P.40.) ... 
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One who merely introduces two parties to a real 
estate transaction, whether or not he solicits those 
persons, does not need to be as knowledgeable about 
real estate transactions as a licensed broker, un-
less, of course, he participates in the negotiations 
Unless he enters into the negotiation of 
the transaction or other activities beyond introduc-
tion, he need not be well versed in real estate law 
or in real estate economics and appraising. 
It is true that the finder's exception presents 
a seeming anomaly in our law. In general, an unli-
censed individual may recover an agreed compensation 
where he merely finds a buyer, seller, lender, or 
borrower, but if in addition to finding such person 
he goes further and helps to conclude the transac-
tion by taking part in negotiating the details of 
the transaction, compromising or composing differ-
ences between the parties, by way of example, he may 
not recover the agreed compensation. 
Nevertheless, when viewed in the light of the 
competing public policies the finder's exception 
is not anomalous. Fundamental to our law is the 
basic principle that persons should perform their 
contracts, and when they breach their agreements, 
action should ordinarily lie to enforce contractual 
duties. On the other hand, the promotion of compe-
tency and integrity in those called upon by the pub-
lic to perform complex duties involving trust is a 
salutary purpose, and the policy underlying the li-
censing statutes must be given full effect. Neither 
considerations of competency nor of trust are of 
importance where the undertaking is merely to seek 
out, locate, find and introduce a buyer, seller, 
borrov:er, or lender to his counterpart or where 
negotiations and completion of the transaction are 
left corapletely to the principals. By enforcing 
the promise to pay a finder's fee we give effect to 
the policy of enforcement of contracts in cases 
where the policy underlying the licensing statute 
does not directly apply. It is for the Legislature, 
not this court, to determine whether the finder's 
exception should be terminated. 
Tyrone v. Kelley, supra, at 69-70 and 72. 
The California court's approach to the broker-finder issue 
is dn ~nlighlened one which recognizes and preserves the 
-13-
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important differences between the two and prevents those Who 
bargain for and receive valuable finder's services from 
avoiding just payment for the same. 
CONCLUSION 
The mere finding and introduction of a buyer is not an 
activity or dealing which results in legal liabilities be-
tween the buyer and seller of realty and thus does not in-
volve the dangers sought to be protected against by the Utah 
Real Estate Brokers Act; therefore, public policy does not 
require that appellant as a finder only be licensed in ord~ 
to recover a commission in good faith contracted for, honestly 
earned and not otherwise disputed. The Act should not be reaa 
to include such activity or dealing, nor require such lie~~ 
ing. 
DATED this /,,t--1 day of December, 1977. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PARSONS & CROWTHER 
B ~~4ztdf~ ~~11. CROWTHER 
By&J~· 
DAVID L. S'l'OTT 
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